The emerging literature on institutional functionalism opens opportunities for historically-and socially-sensitive analysis of institutions, especially if it is complemented by a material understanding of institutions and their location within the wider social structure. This paper engages constructively with the 'credibility' thesis in institutional economics by developing an alternative materialist conception of labour market institutions (LMIs) and applies it to the debates on the Indian industry. Empirical observations collected from field research in various industrial sites in India show that changes to institutional forms have almost always involved labour unrest and conflict, but not always in accordance to the alleged form-function relations. The credibility thesis opens a way for debates on LMIs to move away from the central focus on their forms by evaluating the extent to which institutions are contested within specific socio-historical contexts. Also, the alternative conception suggests that labour, capital and the state may have perspectives on functions of LMIs that may not always coincide, which relate to different types of development. This is of particular interest in the context of India where the on-going policy debates on labour market reforms have primarily focused on 'form' variables. The implication is that the ongoing debates in India focusing on policies that attempt to engineer changes to forms of LMIs may be misguided and ineffective.
Introduction
Amendments to labour laws and modifications of trade unionism have been central to the debates on labour market reforms in India over the past three decades. There is a general recognition that the prevailing forms of these institutions need to be transformed, albeit with disparate opinions on the direction and content of such reforms.
Proponents of labour market flexibility have argued for the removal or weakening of employment protection laws, decentralisation of collective bargaining institutions and reducing the roles played by political parties and external agents, including the state, in mediating industrial relations (for example, see GoI 2002; for further discussion, see Miyamura 2012) . Despite the protestation by trade unions, civil society organisations and academics, the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is currently proposing to introduce various measures to allow greater number of firms to operate outside the coverage of many labour legislations, and to make it more difficult for trade unions to be formed and recognised as representative agents (Deakin and Haldar 2015; Lerche 2015) .
In addition to the standard arguments in favour of flexible labour markets that focus on growth, investment and employment generation, a variant of the Indian debate also points to possible effects of these labour market reforms in creating more harmonious labour-management relations. For example, Anant (2009: 195-200) has suggested that instead of trade unions and the state, 'there is a need to return to trust-based mechanisms' and 'social capital' in improving dispute resolution. The BJP, in its election manifesto, declared labour as the 'pillar of our growth', and suggested labour law reforms as one of the means to promote a 'harmonious relationship between labour and the industry' and to encourage them to embrace the concept of 'industry family' (BJP 2014: 31) . The government's slogan of 'Make in India' necessitates 'disciplined' labour to be employed smoothly by foreign investors the country is attempting to attract. This paper questions the premise assumed in these debates that once implemented, reformed institutions would perform in a predetermined and desired manner. It does so by engaging constructively with emerging approaches to 'institutional functionalism', in particular the 'credibility' thesis, as expounded in this special issue. As discussed in Section 1.1, labour (power) as commodity is distinct in its fundamental indeterminacy, and therefore it is of particular interest to evaluate the applicability of this thesis to the labour market. This paper is the first explicit attempt to explore the scope of the credibility thesis in the context of labour market institutions (LMIs). It also employs statistical technique previously unused for LMIs analysis to examine the thesis using empirical observations drawn from a long-term fieldwork on labour-management relations in Indian manufacturing industry between 2001 and 2014. It is argued that the credibility thesis allows the debates on LMIs to move away from the central focus on their forms by evaluating the extent to which institutions are contested within specific socio-historical contexts. Also, its focus on conflicts and contestations over LMIs highlights the importance of evaluating the forms and functions of these institutions in a context-sensitive manner, most importantly within the social and historical specificity in industrial development and social structure. The latter emphasis is derived from a materialist conceptualisation of LMIs as means to regulate the specific social relations of production. This alternative approach to LMIs, and the 'functionalist' approach more generally, are evaluated in light of debates around the nature of development, especially Selwyn's (2014) proposition for a 'labour-centred development'.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses theoretical developments in approaches to LMIs and examines the scope of the credibility thesis as a framework for understanding institutional diversity and change in labour markets. The meaning of institutions, their forms and functions are re-examined, and an alternative materialist conception of LMIs is proposed.
Section 2 outlines the methodology employed in data collection and discusses contexts for the empirical analysis of this paper. This is followed by Section 3, where a descriptive statistic technique is used to map out broad formal characteristics of LMIs observed in the empirical data.
The resulting 'mapping' of LMIs is interpreted and discussed in Section 4. Section 4.1 compares patterns of LMIs in 'traditional sector' units in Kolkata and Mumbai, while Section 4.2 does the same for the 'modern sector'. Through these observations, the scope for the credibility thesis is discussed. Section 4.3 then draws on selected cases of institutional change to discuss factors underlying the diversity and dynamics of LMIs.
Through the discussion in Section 5 the paper concludes.
Theoretical approaches to labour market institutions (LMIs)
In this Section, an alternative materialist framework for institutional analysis of labour markets is developed. In order to do so, it would be useful to discuss what is meant by LMIs and what their forms and functions mean.
Rethinking LMIs
Mainstream economics have tended to conceive institutions as dichotomous to markets:
thus it refer to a whole range of formal and informal social arrangements from property rights and laws to normative rules and customs. The concept of LMIs more or less follows from this premise. For example, Saint-Paul (2000, 1) characterises LMIs 'as a set of institutions that restrict the ability of private parties to freely set quantities and prices,' while Nunziata (2003, 6 ) defines them as 'the set of rules, regulations, enforcement laws and organizational patterns governing the labour market'.
Note that orthodox neoclassical economics models labour markets as mechanism for smooth matching of labour supply and demand, and for the efficient allocation of labour services to productive sectors. In this sense, those debating LMIs can already be differentiated from this orthodoxy, where there is not room for LMIs. Nevertheless, the mainstream conception of LMIs is primarily focused on applying price theories to the exchange of labour (power or effort), and evaluate their efficiency or welfare implications. Furthermore, LMIs as 'rules' that govern labour markets is ahistorical and does not specify which socio-economic relations are to be prioritised in examining whether or not, and how, markets function differently (Miyamura 2012, 99-102) .
In contrast, this paper proposes an alternative materialist conception of LMIs focused on how social relations of production are regulated, and which is sensitive to particular historical and social contexts in which labour markets operate. In order to do so, it is necessary to start with features of capitalist society as being characterised by conflictual social relations, in essence, between capital and wage-labour (Marx 1973: 100-108) . Of course, in practice class compromise can arise, and indeed, collective bargaining can be understood as a negotiation process for profits to be 'shared' with labour. Nevertheless, capital-labour relations are necessarily conflictual because the production and appropriation of surplus-value is an appropriation of part of the product of the labour of others (Croix 1981: 43) .
Also, although capital-labour relations often involve a variety of social and political expressions, including ethnicity and gender, the essence of capitalist social relations is an 'economic' conflict over the realisation of the labour power, due to its fundamental indeterminacy (Smith 2006; Thompson and Smith 2009) . That is, the extent to which labour power is extracted cannot be predetermined prior to the production process, and therefore systems of management as well as bargained consent from labour are required.
In this context, the role of LMIs can be interpreted more explicitly as means to regulate the structural conflict in the social relations of production. Note that what a 'regulation' of the relations means and what mode it takes are to be empirically worked out by examining the historically-and socially-specific patterns of capitalist development, as shall be discussed for cases in India in Section 4.
The rest of this paper will focus on collective bargaining institutions, in particular procedures for collective bargaining, and formations of trade unionism and other labour organisations. These, along with other institutions governing Indian labour markets, such as patriarchy and caste, are institutional conditions for extraction of surplus value and accumulation to take place, or the social structure of accumulation (Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982; Harriss-White 2003: 119) .
Postulated form-function relations in LMIs
Given the mainstream conception, the focus of much of the literature has been on identifying the 'right' forms of LMIs, which hinder the market mechanism less, and promote employment and productivity growth. Also, in many of the existing models, institutional functions are assumed to follow immediately from their forms. Thus, Freeman (1993) describes the traditional debates on LMIs to have been between the 'distortionists' who claim that the presence of labour laws or trade unions is necessarily harmful to efficiency and productivity due to their interference with the functioning of labour markets (Agarwala 1983; Fallon and Lucas 1991, Mangel, DeLorme and Kamerschen 1994; amongst others) and 'institutionalists' associating LMIs with potentially value-enhancing effects (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Standing 1992) . In particular, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) propose a humpshaped model to articulate that highly centralised or highly decentralised bargaining structures are less likely to encourage wage militancy by unions compared to intermediately centralised ones. Similarly, Pencavel (1995) suggests that trade unions affiliated to political parties are more likely to see their bargaining strategies detached from 'dealings with the employers and the workers they represent' (p. 3).
In the Indian debate, GoI (2002) has recommended weakening of employment protective clauses in legislation and removal of party-links in trade unions organisations as means to increase formal employment and raise productivity. Interestingly, Teitelbaum (2011) has countered studies such as Besley and Burgess (2004) by arguing that employment protective legislation and party-affiliated unionism strengthen the ability of the state to manage and 'restrain' labour militancy, and thereby can improve productivity and employment growth, but nevertheless remaining within the same causal logic of linking forms of LMIs to functions.
Credibility thesis in LMIs
There have been recent attempts within institutional economics, including the contributions to this special issue, to shift the analytical focus away from the fixation on institutional forms to discuss how they function. A variant of this 'functionalist' approach to institutional theory 3 is the 'credibility' thesis, which Ho (2014, 16 ) has defined as 'the perception of endogenously, autonomously shaped institutions as a common arrangement'. In highlighting 'the endogeneity of credibility ', Grabel (2000, 2;  11) considers roles played by 'class conflict, and the distribution of income, wealth and political power' in shaping the credibility of policies and institutions. By doing so, this
approach focuses on what functions existing institutions and property rights fulfil as a way to explain their emergence and persistence.
In the context of LMIs, the research agenda proposed by the credibility thesis focuses the analysis and debates on the varied and dynamic ways in which prevailing collective bargaining arrangements and labour organisations are supported or contested by bargaining agents, and how these conflicts are managed at a given time and space (Ho 2014: 18 (Pattenden 2016) . As Lebowitz (2003) suggests, labour's struggle for its own development can coincide with capitalist development, but this is process is not automatic and often uneven (Das 2012) . Thus, if LMIs are to be evaluated for their developmental implications, it matters which benchmark for development is to be prioritised, and this issue will be revisited in the Conclusion of this paper.
Fieldwork data and context
The empirical analysis of labour-management relations in this paper is based on The empirical analysis provided in this paper is intended to capture some important aspects of the regional and sectoral diversity in changes to LMIs in the context of industrial restructuring in India. For this purpose, two rounds of fieldwork, the first in 2001 and the second in 2013-14, have been carried out, with samples chosen from regional and sectoral 'strata' outlined in Table 1 .
( Table 1) As LMIs are conceptualised as regulating social relations of production, it is important that our analysis of their forms and functions take into account of differences in technological and organisational conditions. For this purpose, fieldwork has been carried out in a number of mills and factories in a wide variety of different types of industrial activities, which might be categorised as 'traditional' and 'modern' industries.
Jute textile manufacturing in Kolkata and cotton textile manufacturing in Mumbai are represented by the 'traditional' sector, both industries with historical roots in the 1850s.
Conventional mills in this sector are characterised by labour-intensive nature of production and relatively small changes in the technology used, although there are a small number of 'progressive' mills that have adopted newer labour-replacing technology in recent decades as discussed in Section 4.1. In contrast, the 'modern'
sector includes a wider range of different types of manufacturing firms, which are relatively new, although some were established as early as the 1920s and '30s. The production technology in the 'modern' sector units is more capital-intensive, and many of the production processes require much higher levels of technology and skills than in jute and cotton textile manufacturing. Although none of these factories is operating at the global technological production frontier, the discussion in Section 4 shows diverse trajectory of technological changes in Indian industries. While some production units surveyed in this research saw technological upgrading and improvements in labour productivity, others such as the Kolkata jute textile sector have seen limited changes to production technology and organisation. Diversity and dynamics of institutional arrangements in regulating labour regulations will be interpreted in the context of this uneven development.
In addition to the differences in technological and organisational conditions, the capacity for different sections of capital, labour and the state to reshape the regulation over relations of production also depends on the historical context of industrial development and the particular ways in which labour management has been institutionalised within the broader political economy. The two main sites of the fieldwork have been Kolkata and Mumbai 6 , which were amongst the oldest industrial centres of India dating from the colonial period (Sinha 2006; Roy 2013) Sample selection from the four strata was non-probabilistic: access to factory units depended heavily on personal contacts and cooperation. The selection can be considered 'judgemental' or 'purposive' in that they were based on certain predetermined criteria, as outlined in the 'strata' in Table 1 , ensuring that units with a variety of technological and performance-levels, and market status within the sector were included (see also Miyamura 2011) . Given the lack of information on the relationship between the sample and the sampling frame, it is difficult to evaluate the extent of 'representativeness' of the data, but for the reasons discussed above, it is likely that the sample captures some aspects of the diversity and dynamics of labour-management relations in Indian industry. The empirical analysis of this paper combines descriptive statistics of the fieldwork data with case study approaches, which have allowed for significant empirical depth not achievable with available survey data. Although the objective of the case studies is to analyse institutional arrangements in labour-management relations in the sample, rather than to demonstrate its representativeness, comparison will be made with other studies as additional empirical support.
Multivariate analysis of labour market institutions (LMIs) in Indian industry
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to empirically examine the conceptual and theoretical issues outlined in Section 1. To describe the broad patterns in forms of Table 2 .
( Table 2) ( Figure 2 and Table 4 to be on the same page]
As a statistical method, multidimensional scaling (MDS) is adopted to reduce the number of dimensions in the data matrix and categorise types of LMIs in the surveyed units. MDS is an explicitly data exploratory method that does not impose predetermined probabilistic models in its procedure, but instead used to examine broad patterns of similarities and differences in the forms of LMIs amongst units surveyed.
The objective of the MDS is to 'map' these units in a reduced multidimensional space, so that their relative positions in the space reflect the rank order of proximities between these observations (see Dillon and Goldstein 1984) . 
Diversity and dynamics of LMIs in Indian industry
As discussed in Section 3, form-centred analysis formulated in the MDS mapping in 
Comparison of LMIs in the modern sector in Kolkata and Mumbai
Despite the heterogeneity of products and business activities amongst units included in the 'modern' sector category, all but one unit 9 based in Kolkata are represented by points G and H, clustered in close proximity around the bottom of the mapping in Figure 2 , reflecting similarity in institutional forms as measured by the seven variables used for the MDS. As shown in Table 4 The more diverse and fluid institutional forms in Mumbai's 'modern' sector compared to its Kolkata counterparts is difficult to explain on the basis of technology alone, given that the 'modern sector' in both cities includes a mix of comparable production units.
While the stability of prevailing LMIs in Kolkata jute textile aforementioned in Section 4.1 may partly be attributed to regulations, none of the units in the modern sector discussed here receives similar level of government protection. That party-affiliated unionism dominates and continues to be relatively stable in Kolkata despite decentralised bargaining structure once again implies the continued relative importance of organised labour for political mobilisation in West Bengal. In contrast, Maharashtra, where Mumbai is located, is one of regions in which the Congress party has dominated the State politics, apart from being ousted from power in 1995-99, and recently in October 2014. Like the CPI(M) in Kolkata, the Congress has also attempted to incorporate organised labour through its trade union wing, and in sectors such as textile, has imposed it as the sole representative union, as discussed in Section 4.1. However in Maharashtra, the importance of organised labour in regional politics diminished and while party-affiliated unions continue to exist, Mumbai became the centre of the socalled new trade union movement since the 1960s with independent unionists increasingly gaining influence (Bhattacherjee 1998; Hensman 2011) . The dynamics of LMIs, especially in relation to the type of union leadership and their affiliation, appears to reflect the capacity of rank-and-file workers to contest prevailing institutions, although this is not simply by party-affiliated unions being replaced by independent or internal leaders in Mumbai. While in some cases party-affiliation was abandoned in favour of independent or internal leaders, in others Mumbai workers have strengthened external ties and in some cases even ousted internal leaders. To examine this, further trajectories of changes to institutional forms are discussed next.
Dynamics of LMIs
This sub-section draws on selected cases of institutional change to discuss factors underlying their trajectories. Significantly apart from one case, changes in forms of Of the observed cases of institutional change, KM10, a plant manufacturing water dispenser originally in Kolkata, and two units, NM1 and NM2, located in the industrial area in the national capital region (NCR) around Delhi and belonging to separate passenger transport vehicle companies both with foreign direct investment, have seen formation of trade unions between the fieldwork periods. This is reflected in KM10 and NM1 shifting from K to H, and NM2 to J, the difference being that the union is affiliated to a labour-wing of a political party in the former two units, while the latter is unaffiliated to any external organisation. These cases run against the popular perception of diminished roles of trade unionism under neoliberal globalisation, and also are of importance in the context of India's on-going policy debate.
Apart from these four cases, there are also several cases where formal changes to LMIs, as measure by the seven variables used in MDS, had taken place prior to the initial fieldwork of 2001, including at MT4, MT5 and (the aforementioned) MM4. There are also certain changes to institutional forms that were not captured by the variables adopted: for example, many units in Mumbai had seen trade unions shifting their affiliation from one political party to another. However, the majority of formal changes to LMIs in surveyed units accompanied closure of units and relocation of production.
The abovementioned union formation in KM10, the water dispenser manufacturing plant, resulted from concerns amongst workers that the management was planning to shift its production away from Kolkata, affiliating themselves to CITU in order to gain support from CPI(M), which was still in power. Two years after unionisation, and a CPI(M) brokered voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) and retrenchment settlement, the company shifted production to NM4, located in the north Indian region of Chandigarh and operates without a union, reflected in a shift to point K.
While in the above cases production shift accompanied de-unionisation, this was not always the case. KM5 and MM3 were light bulb and lamp factories with more or less the same production technology and organisation, and managed by the same multinational company, but were operating in Kolkata and Mumbai respectively. While In other cases where unionisation was maintained in the relocated unit, capacity to build solidarity and linkages with extra-plant organisations and movements was significant.
MM6, a Mumbai-based assembly plant run by an Indian automobile company was closed in the early 2000s, with its production shifted to MM10, near Pune, Maharashtra.
MM6 had two unions, both party-unaffiliated (categorised as point I), which followed the company to MM10. An industrial dispute unfolded when another Pune-based external union joined and the management attempted to eject unions from the previous plant. In 2010, the three unions merged to form an internal union led by rank-and-file workers, with the support of an independent federation of unions in the region, thus shifting LMIs to point J.
Similarly, MM5, a Mumbai plant belonging to a multinational consumer goods The trajectories and outcomes of these changes appear also to be associated with the different capacity of workers to mobilise collective action of their own, whether to defend their livelihoods or to build solidarity beyond their narrow economic interests.
For example, unionisation in the multinational transport vehicle companies in the NCR, NM1 and NM2, was achieved through workers' mobilisation over several years, facing attempts by the management and the State government to undermine their formation, and involving a number of high profile confrontations that resulted in violence. Unions at these multinational transport vehicle companies appear to at least attempt to mobilise struggles on issues beyond the narrow interests of their members, for example, by supporting strike action by contract workers demanding wage equalisation to permanent workers, or taking solidarity action with unions in disputes at other factories in the region. Similarly, workers at the automobile plant in Pune, MM10, were able to consolidate its labour organisation with the support of regional union federation.
In this context, a comparison of two cases of India-wide company federation is particularly of interest. The management strategy to undermine extra-factory union federations, combined with closures of their organising hubs, resulted in the collapse of the federation and narrowing of union strategies to unit-level gains in the light bulb and lamp factories (MM3/ KM5/ GM1), whereas in the soap and detergent company (MM5/ MM8/ MM9), the federation has not only been retained, but strengthened even after the relocation of production. The latter company union federation in the multinational soap and detergent company cultivated access to international organisations and diplomatic communities, and linked its struggle to global solidarity movements as means to strengthen their capacity to contest LMIs. However, far from a transition from a 'national period' to a 'new period of labour internationalism' (Munck 2002: 154) , the capacity of these unions to appeal to international organisations and movements was based on their 'associational power' (Wright 2000: 962) at the plant level. It also once again supports the credibility thesis in their rejection of form-function relation, in that apparently similar institutional form has been observed to result in very different trajectories of institutional change.
Conclusion
The findings of this paper shows the scope of the credibility thesis in moving debates on LMIs beyond the fixation on form-function relations, and opens the possibility for institutional change to be interpreted as reflecting the intensification of conflict and contestation over prevailing institutional arrangements. Given the antagonistic nature of social relations of production, the stability of institutional forms may not necessarily signal lack of conflicts in labour relations. But the observation that formal institutional change accompanied heightening of industrial conflicts in all but one production units in this study is consistent with the link between institutional credibility and conflict postulated.
In addition to conflict over LMIs, the majority of cases in which changes to the form of LMIs were observed experienced relocation of production from traditional industrial centres to sites with limited history of industrial labour movements. From the perspective that forms of LMIs are tied up with other political and juridical institutions, it is perhaps not surprising that shifting production to a location with a very different social structure triggers changes to institutional forms. Moreover, it is significant that, while relocation was associated with de-unionisation in some cases (MT5/GT1 and KM10/NM4), in others unionisation was maintained (MM6/MM10 and MM5/MM8/MM9) or reorganised (KM5/MM3/GM1). In the latter case, even in the period without unions, the plant had a 'workers' committee' to mediate labourmanagement relations. These observations highlight the continued importance of LMIs even in regions where workforce has historically not been unionised. This is significant in the context of policy propositions in favour of non-unionised 'flexible' labour regimes in India.
The observation that LMIs have been less diverse and more stable in Kolkata than in
Mumbai goes against presumption made in some theoretical models (Banerji, Campos and Sabot 1995; Pencavel 1995) The findings of this paper also reveal that functions of LMIs can depend on whose perspective they are to be evaluated. On the one hand, the resilience of LMIs may imply stable conditions for production to continue and employment to be maintained for incumbent managers and workers in the formal sector establishments in Kolkata, but may not necessarily be 'developmental', either in the sense of dynamic capitalist development or labouring class struggles (Lerche 2010; Selwyn 2014; Pattenden 2016 ).
On the other hand, the diverse and fluid LMIs in Mumbai may have reflected the capacity of both capital and labour to contest prevailing institutional arrangements, although this has eventually accompanied de-industrialisation and significant loss of employment in the city. Industrial relocation has in some cases led to 'development' either in technological upgrading and strengthening of labouring class mobilisation beyond the shop floor level, but in diverse and uneven ways, which once gain points to the importance of historically-and socially-sensitive analysis. These are question that conventional analysis focusing on institutional forms does not ask. The credibility thesis extended to LMIs in this paper offers a first step to addressing these issues. 
